



MONETARY, FISCAL AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES FROM 
THE VIEWPOINT OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROZONE: 

















E-mail address of the authors:  lavracv@ier.si  
 
 
Editor of the WP series: Peter Stanovnik 
 
 
©     2002 Institute for Economic Research 
 
 






The paper surveys recent academic literature in monetary policy, fiscal policy and 
exchange rate policy from the viewpoint of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. It 
starts by overviewing some currently most debated issues in the area of monetary policy, 
first in general, then from the point of the ECB (European Central Bank) and finally from 
the point of view of CEEC (Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries) in their 
run up to the EU and to the eurozone. The paper also overviews some fiscal policy and 
exchange rate policy dilemmas of CEEC related to their monetary policies and finally 






Key words:  
economic and monetary union 
eurozone,  
euro, 
monetary policy,  
fiscal policy,  






It is expected that Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries (CEEC) will join 
the EMU (European Monetary Union) in a couple of years after their accession in the EU. 
The eastward enlargement of the eurozone will bring new challenges to both EU countries 
and CEEC. This paper surveys recent academic literature and identifies some open 
questions in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, seen from the viewpoint of the 
eastward enlargement of the eurozone. The focus of the paper is on monetary policy issues. 
Monetary integration in general, and monetary union as its highest stage in particular, is 
about giving up national monetary policy authonomy in favour of the single currency and 
single monetary policy. However, this survey should not confine itself solely to monetary 
questions, as both fiscal policies and exchange rate policies have a direct impact on the 
conduct of monetary policies and can be crucial for the success of the European single 
monetary policy.  
 
The paper is organised in three separate, although related parts. The first part overviews 
monetary policy issues, the second discusses fiscal policy issues and the third part surveys 




I.  MONETARY POLICY 
 
Research on eastward enlargement of the eurozone involves monetary policy issues both in 
the EU member countries and in CEEC. In this survey we will first shortly focus on some 
more general monetary policy issues dealt with in recent academic literature, and then 
concentrate on some more specific problems of monetary policy, first from the point of 
view of the European central bank and then from the point of view of CEEC. 
 
Recent academic literature on monetary policy issues covers a very wide spectrum of 
topics within the central theme of what central bankers do or should be doing (for a survey, 
see Clarida, 1999, King, 2000, Herrero, 2001). In this survey we can have only a very 
limited ambition to discuss some of the issues which may have a particular relevance for 
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the topic of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. In this context, we limit ourselves to 
two general issues: a) the ultimate goal of monetary policy, which involves discussion on 
price stability and on specifics of monetary policy in low inflation environment, and b) the 
intermediate target of monetary policy, which involves discussion on alternative monetary 
strategies and on inflation targeting in particular. 
 
Considering the ultimate goal of the monetary policy and the primary responsibility of a 
central bank the literature now widely agrees that the final goal of monetary policy should 
be (only) price stability. This final goal is being increasingly incorporated in the statutes of 
national central banks, including the ECB and those of the candidate countries. The 
question remains whether this should be the sole ultimate goal of monetary policy or there 
is room for any other additional goals which central banks should try to achieve with their 
monetary policies? There is a common understanding that price stability should have a 
definite and explicit primacy over any alternative final goals, such as output or 
employment stabilisation (Feldstein, 1999, Smets, 2000, Oesterreichische nationalbank 
1999, ECB 2001). Such alternative goals should be clearly subordinated to the goal of 
price stability and pursued only to the extent where they are not in conflict with the 
primary goal. However, it is recognised that in practice, central banks in the actual conduct 
of their monetary policies sometimes follow some simple rules, such as Taylor rule of 
Taylor-type rules, where in setting the interest rate they take account of both inflation and 
output gaps (Clarida, 1998, McCallum, 1997, Taylor, 1999a and b). 
 
A related question is what is actually meant by price stability, how it should be determined 
and measured. In particular, does it mean zero inflation rate, or is perhaps some low level 
inflation rate consistent with the idea of price stability? As the result of experience of past 
decades price stability is now widely accepted as a value per se, which led to its 
unquestioned position as an ultimate goal of monetary policy. Inflation is detrimental for 
long term growth. Phillips curve is considered to be vertical, which means there is no 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. By higher inflation a country does not get 
more growth and/or employment but just ends up with more inflation. Inflation has serious 
negative economic effects, as it impairs the functions of money, distorts price signals, 
causes additional costs (such as shoe-leather costs, having to do with activities devoted to 
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economising on money held, and such as menu costs, having to do with frequent pricing 
changes) and leads to socially undesirable redistributions. The effects of inflation of course 
depend on how far an economy is indexed, whether there is some money illusion and 
possibility for surprise inflation and which rigidities, nominal or real, prevail in the 
economy.  
 
However, recent monetary literature emphasizes specifics of low inflation (Ackerlof, 1996, 
Svensson, 2000, Herrero, 2001). According to these views, Phillips curve may at low 
inflation level be sloped, and there may be some gains from low inflation, particularly if 
nominal rigidities prevail over real rigidities in the economy. Low inflation can have some 
beneficial effects, like allowing for an easier adjustment of relative prices (the so-called 
grease in the wheels effect). Other authors, however, find evidence of opposite effect, 
particularly when real rigidities prevail. According to them, even low inflation is harmful 
(the so called sand in the wheels effect).  
 
Conduct of monetary policy in an environment of low inflation gave rise to a discussion on 
some specific issues in the academic literature, such as zero-bound problem and the 
problem of measurement (overstatement) of inflation (Svensson, 1999a, Herrero, 2001, 
Ackerlof, 1996). According to the first, with very low inflation there is a natural limit to 
lowering of the interest rate, when it approaches the zero value, as it can not become 
negative in nominal terms. According to zero-bound view in this case monetary policy 
loses its most important instrument and can become ineffective. Opponents argue that there 
are other mechanisms of transmission and instruments which can be activated so that 
monetary policy remains effective. The second problem is related to the measurement of 
inflation, particularly to possible overstatement of inflation. This may have as a 
consequence that at a low level of inflation deflationary pressures are in fact present, which 
give rise to different problems and tasks for the monetary policy. Both these concerns 
combine to the belief that some low level inflation can be more desirable than setting the 
price stability goal of the monetary policy actually at zero inflation rate. 
 
The second issue on which we concentrate in this survey is the choice of the monetary 
strategy among alternative available monetary frameworks such as monetary targeting, 
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inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting (Mahadeva, 2000). In recent academic 
literature particular emphasis is being given to inflation targeting as a relatively new and 
still evolving monetary strategy (Mishkin, 1999 and 2000, Svensson, 1997, Bernake, 2000, 
Haldane, 1995). Adopting inflation targeting as a monetary framework is a fashionable 
trend also in practice, since an increasing number of countries are actually adopting this 
monetary strategy while others are still considering to switch to it. Inflation targeters are to 
be found in all groups of countries, including the transition economies. In comparison with 
other alternative monetary strategies, inflation targeters perform better (Mishkin, 2001). 
 
Inflation targeting in fact can mean quite different arrangements with differing technical 
solutions, which share the common principle – to anchor inflationary expectations by 
giving clear and transparent commitment to the public by the monetary authorities. Some 
open questions (Smets, 2000, Svensson, 1999b, Mishkin, 2000) remain the following: a) 
What should be targeted, inflation rate or price level? b) Point inflation rate or inflation 
band? c) Band with the middle point or without it? d) Closed band or one-sided open band? 
e) Length of the targeted horizon? f) Use of escape clauses in case of missing the target? g) 
What price index to use? h) Core or headline inflation?  One specific question dealt in the 
literature is the role of asset prices in inflation targeting (Bernake, 2000, Mishkin, 2001). 
Should asset prices such as housing prices, stock prices and exchange rates be included in 
price indices and thus targeted? The prevailing view is that asset prices should be helpful 
in preparing inflation forecasts, but that the central banks should not try to control such 
overall price indices and target asset prices directly, mostly because of the problem of 
identifying the bubbles in asset prices.  
 
Next we move from these more general issues of monetary policy dealt with in the 
academic literature to those more directly relevant for the theme of the paper, first to those 
having to do with the ECB and the conduct of the single European monetary policy since 
the move to EMU in 1999 (Begg, 1998, Favero, 2000, Buiter, 1999, ECB, 1999 and 2001, 
Gaspar, 2001, Gerlach, 1999 and 2000, Issing, 2000). The issues which were discussed 
rather critically in the literature can be grouped under these main headings: a) ultimate goal 
of the ECB (price stability), its concrete definition (inflation rate of 0-2 per cent in the 
medium term) and the results in achieving it, b) monetary strategy of the ECB (two pillars 
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strategy, which many authors find an unclear and inconsistent mix of monetary targeting 
and inflation targeting), c) exchange rate policy of the ECB (benign neglect concept, with 
discrete interventions as opposed to the rules, such as target zones), including the weakness 
of the euro, d) issues of independence, accountability and transparency of the ECB, 
including the communication of its monetary policy decisions to the public, e) problems of 
leading the single European monetary policy compared to national monetary policies (with 
issues such as lack of track record and inherited credibility, stability of money demand in 
new circumstances, differences in transmission mechanisms among member countries, and 
how to accommodate national specific cycles into “average” economic conditions in the 
eurozone which a single monetary policy should be addressing). 
 
However, from the point of view of the Eastward enlargement of the eurozone, the most 
important question concerning the ECB is the following: Is there a danger for the single 
European monetary policy from letting CEEC join the eurozone, and in particular, from 
letting them join the eurozone too early? The assumption here is that the first theoretically 
possible date for CEEC for joining the eurozone is 2006. This is based on the assumption 
of their joining the EU and the ERM 2 in 2004 and their joining the eurozone two years 
later, in 2006. The more realistic scenarios which add legal, technical and economic reason 
for delaying somewhat this process, do not define this time frame precisely, but have in 
mind postponing the entry of CEEC in the eurozone for a couple of years. 
 
Can the inclusion of CEEC supposedly weaker currencies in the euro area lead to 
additional problems of the European single monetary policy and to the less stable euro? In 
particular, can it corrupt the decision-making process in the ECB when formulating its 
monetary policy, leading to lower credibility of the ECB and to easing of the single 
European monetary policy? For various reasons we think that these potential dangers 
should not materialise: a) by that time, after all the adjustments having been made and the 
Maastricht convergence criteria fulfilled, the currencies of CEEC need not be less stable, 
b) being small countries (with some exception of Poland) their combined weight in the 
euro is negligible, so they can not have an effect on the euro that would be worth 
mentioning, c) decision making process on the single European monetary policy in the 
ECB is based on stability culture, and not on weighing and averaging individual nationally 
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determined interests regarding monetary policy, d) with the inclusion of CEEC in the 
eurosystem, the rules and procedures of decision making on the single monetary policy in 
the ECB may change, so as to accommodate the larger number of countries in the 
governing board of the ECB without making the decision making process on single 
monetary policy too complicated and inefficient. 
 
We not turn to monetary policies of CEEC with particular view on how the process of their 
EU and EMU accession as well as their transition-specific characteristics will shape their 
monetary policies in the period before their joining the eurozone. It should be noted that 
monetary and exchange rate matters are particularly for these economies heavily 
interrelated, so – to avoid repeating and overlapping - some of the monetary policy issues 
that are directly related to their exchange rate policies are covered in the chapter on 
exchange rates in this state-of- the art report. 
 
CEEC at the moment experience very different monetary arrangements and policies (Begg, 
1996 and 1999, Cottareli, 1999), but in the process of their EU, ERM2 and EMU accession 
they will have to adjust their monetary arrangements in not so distant future to the 
requirements of the single monetary European policy. In other words, they will have to 
prepare to make their monetary policies more and more compatible with the single 
European monetary policy. 
 
This is also the result of legal requirements in the process of accession negotiations and 
adoption of the aquis communautaire in the field of EMU, which put additional constraints 
on monetary policies of CEEC. They have to make their central banks independent, 
completely open themselves to capital flows, prohibit direct financing of the government 
by the central bank and prevent any privileged access of the government to financial 
institutions, by the time of their EU accession. Finally, before joining the EMU and 
adopting the euro, CEEC will have to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria on a 
sustainable and healthy basis. These include, alongside with the two fiscal criteria, three 
monetary criteria, which clearly define the mandate of their monetary policies in the period 
before their inclusion in the eurozone. The Maastricht convergence criterion on inflation 
implies they have to focus on disinflation in this interim period. In the specific 
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circumstances of these countries, to which we turn in more detail later, disinflation from 
present levels of inflation to the Maastricht reference value may be a demanding challenge. 
However, the role of the monetary policy should not be seen in isolation and 
overemphasised. Monetary policy should be consistent with and supported by other 
macroeconomic policies, particularly by prudent fiscal and income policies. 
Overburdening the monetary policy otherwise can result in too strict monetary policies, 
which may lead to unnecessary losses in output and employment, which can run against 
their needed catching-up process and real convergence with the EU. 
 
At the moment, before their EU accession, CEEC have their full monetary sovereignty, 
both from the formal and from the factual point of view. Formally, they will retain their 
monetary sovereignty until they adopt the euro and join the single European monetary 
policy. Factually, their monetary policy independence is becoming more and more limited, 
the more they come closer to fixing the exchange rate and to liberalising their capital 
flows. With the entry in the EU and ERM 2, their exchange rate policies (and for that 
matter, their economic policies in general) become the matter of common concern, which 
means subject to coordination and surveillance. Those CEEC, which already completely 
liberalised their capital flows and completely fixed their exchange rates (currency board 
regimes) or are planning to do so in the near future (unilateral euroisation) are giving up 
their factual (if not yet formal) monetary sovereignty. In this respect they are already in a 
(unilateral) monetary union, as their monetary policies are completely tied to the single 
European monetary policy. 
 
From the point of view of CEEC, their monetary policies should be focused on devising 
credible disinflation strategies, preparing themselves for the soft landing in the eurozone. 
Their monetary policies should be framed in the context of the process of their accession to 
the EU, ERM 2 and EMU, and considering their transition-specific circumstances, such as 
the following: 
 
a) The need for building up institutions (independence of central banks, supervision of 
the banking sector, development of money and capital markets) and to speed up 
structural reforms in the real and financial sector; 
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b) Special importance of the exchange rate (as small and open economies) and exposure 
to capital flows, particularly before their EU entry, but perhaps also in the ERM 2 
period before their accession to the eurozone; 
c) The need for real convergence and catching up, leading to their exposure to transition 




II.  FISCAL POLICY 
 
The eastward enlargement of the eurozone concerns fiscal policies in both EU countries 
and in CEEC. Fiscal policies in CEEC are affected by fiscal policies in the EU countries 
and are constrained by the fact that their fiscal position should shortly adjust to the EU 
fiscal requirements. They are already involved in fiscal surveillance procedures. After their 
EU accession their economic policies, including fiscal policies, become the matter of 
common concern and subject to coordination and supervision procedures. And finally, 
CEEC will have to comply with the fiscal rules of the EU, in particular with excessive 
deficit rules and Stability and growth pact requirements. On the way to the eurozone, 
before adopting the euro they will have to meet the two Maastricht fiscal criteria (on fiscal 
deficit and public debt). After joining the EU and before entering the eurozone they will be 
subject to some of the provision of the Stability and growth pact and will have to prepare 
convergence reports on the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence (including fiscal) 
criteria. After joining the euro area, CEEC will have to comply with all Stability and 
growth pact requirements and will have to prepare stability reports, with the aim to report 
on the sustainability of their fiscal position in the monetary union. All these processes and 
requirements from their joining the EU and eurozone will call for considerable effort and 
adjustments in their current fiscal policies and positions. On the other hand, fiscal policies 
of the EU countries themselves are being affected by the prospect of eastern enlargement 
of the eurozone, as the eastern enlargement will be a burden for the EU budget, although 
actual costs are still undetermined and subject to negotiations on the last, most difficult and 
financially most demanding chapters in the negotiations on the EU accession of CEEC.  
 
Literature of fiscal policy issues, particularly in Europe, is concentrated on the role of the 
fiscal policy itself (and in relation to monetary policy) in the framework of EMU. Along 
with more traditional issues such as fiscal discipline (Von Hagen, 1996, Canzonieri, 1996 
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and 1998, Kopits, 1998), sustainability of fiscal position (Perotti, 1997, Bayoumi, 1995a, 
Alesina, 1997 and 1998, De Bandt, 2000), optimal macroeconomic policy mix (Begg, 
2000), the emphasis is on the constraints on national and EU-wide fiscal policies which 
derive from the single monetary policy in the EMU (Mongeli, 1999, Fatas, 2000, Masson 
1996 and 2000). As regards the EU-wide policy, literature focuses on issues related to 
fiscal federalism (Hewitt, 1992, Kletzer, 2000, Ter-Minassian, 1997, Von Hagen, 1996, 
Mihaljek, 1998). The debate touches first the question of distribution of fiscal powers 
among different levels of government (supranational, national, regional, local) and next, 
related to this, should the EU aim for a EU-wide fiscal policy, modelled on the fiscal 
system of the federal states (Von Hagen, 1993, Sala-i-Martin, 1992, Bayoumi, 1995, 
Persson, 1996). Of course, contrary to monetary policy, there is no such thing as a single 
fiscal policy, so even in the EMU fiscal policy remains decentralised and in the hands of 
individual member countries. The question is primarily about the size of the EU budget, 
which is compared to national federal states extremely small and furthermore inflexible, 
i.e. earmarked for specific purposes, mostly for agriculture (CAP). However, in the 
literature the question is raised whether with the move to the EMU there is a need to 
substantially increase fiscal powers at the EU-wide level. For political reasons, it seems 
very unlikely that any substantial change in the size of the EU budget will be possible, at 
least in the short-term.  
 
The idea for a EU-wide fiscal policy derives from the roles of the national fiscal policies, 
which through their alocative, stabilising and redistributional effects can affect economic 
situation in individual regions within the state. Through automatic stabilisers or even with 
active fiscal policy the state can redistribute income in the direction of those regions which 
have suffered negative asymmetric shocks and thereby help to stabilise their income. In the 
EMU, member countries adopted the single currency, gave up their own monetary and 
exchange rate policies and became from a monetary point of view similar to regions within 
the states. In case of negative asymmetric shocks, which lead to decrease in their output 
and/or employment, they would need additional or alternative macroeconomic policies, 
common fiscal policy in the first place, which could substitute for the loss of the monetary 
and exchange rate instruments of adjustment in the monetary union in order to help them 
neutralize negative shocks (Obstfeld, 1998). Based on the above argument, current 
literature deals with the issue of whether it is possible and advisable to build an EU-wide 
common fiscal policy (Melitz, 1991, Belke, 1998, Fatas, 1998). 
 
Another research topic considers the role of the national fiscal policies in the EMU, where 
two opposing views can be detected. According to the first, because of the EMU, member 
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countries should have more flexibility in the conduct of their national fiscal policies, while 
according to the second (which prevailed in the EU), national fiscal policies should be 
constrained by the fiscal rules of the EU.  
 
The first view starts from the belief that the burden of macroeconomic stabilisation in a 
member country of a monetary union should to a larger extent now fall on their national 
fiscal policies, since their monetary policies are lost. In case of a negative asymmetric 
shock, a country should depend on its fiscal policy, by letting automatic stabilisers, if not 
by its active fiscal policy, counteract recessionary impact of the negative shock. According 
to this view the fact that a country joins a monetary union calls for a greater role of its 
national fiscal policy, therefore the EU fiscal rules should allow for autonomy and 
flexibility of national fiscal policies.  
 
The second view starts from the belief that national fiscal policies in a monetary union 
have strong spill-over effects which can cause negative externalities for other member 
countries or for the EMU as a whole. Fiscal rules of the EMU should therefore limit the 
flexibility of national fiscal policies. A country which would use its fiscal policy to 
counteract a negative asymmetric shock, risks that its fiscal position becomes 
unsustainable, if unfavourable public debt dynamics develops. Negative external effects for 
other member countries come in the form of higher interest rates, which spill-over the 
entire EMU, and/or pressures on the ECB to lead a more accommodating monetary policy 
(if we leave aside the bailing-out problem, which, however, according to the literature may 
or may not exist). To prevent free-riding and spill-over effects, the EU rules seriously 
constrain national fiscal policies of member countries. This is the reason for adopting 
excessive deficit rules in the Treaty on EU, for the fiscal Maastricht convergence criteria as 
a precondition to joining the EMU, and for the Stability and growth pact for the period 
after joining the EMU. In particular, the rules of the Stability and growth pact raised some 
controversies in the literature (Buti, 1998, Eichengreen, 1998). First issue is their 
enforceability, since the sanctions require a 2/3 majority of votes, which may be hard to 
achieve, and second issue is that sanctions have negative economic impact on countries 
which are already in troubles. Third issue finally is that currently some member countries 
are close to upper limits of their fiscal deficits according to the Stability and growth pact 
provisions, which limits their room for leading flexible fiscal policies in case of an early 
recession, which according to recent developments seems to be a realistic danger. In 
concluding it can be said that research still needs to answer the question where to draw the 
right line between centralisation and national competencies of fiscal policies in the EMU.  
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These issues seem to some extent forward-looking from the current viewpoint of CEEC, 
but they show the direction of fiscal adjustments which they will have to undertake in not 
so distant future (Ministry of Finance, 2000). For the moment they have to concentrate on 
the right mix of macroeconomic policies and on overcoming some burdens of transition-
related fiscal situation (Tanzi, 1992) and in particular to move from fiscal dominance to 




III.  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
 
Research on optimal or appropriate exchange rate regimes of CEEC should from the 
viewpoint of eastward enlargement of the eurozone be seen in the light of future accession 
of these countries to the EU and to the EMU (or euro area, to be more precise). Relevant 
academic literature conventionally starts from the description of alternative exchange rate 
arrangements actually used in these countries and goes on to compare their relative 
advantages and disadvantages. (Edwards and Sevastano, 1999, European parliament, 1999, 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, Feldman, 1998). 
 
CEEC actually opted for very different arrangements, from the very rigid to almost 
completely flexible exchange rate regimes. Economic analysis concentrates on 
determinants of this choice, which can be found in structural characteristics of individual 
countries, or in the main focus of their macroeconomic policies, i.e., the nature of the 
problem which the exchange rate policy is primarily concerned with (nominal anchoring, 
desinflation, external competitiveness, capital inflow problem etc.). (Begg, Halpern and 
Wyplosz, 1999, Kopits, 1999, Masson, 1999). Main conclusions from the research on 
exchange rate regimes of CEE countries in the recent literature are the following: First, no 
exchange rate regime is a priori superior to others, choice of the exchange rate arrangement 
should be tailored to specific circumstances of a country. (Frenkel, 1999). Therefore, in 
this phase, before the EU accession, all exchange rate regimes in use are acceptable for 
CEEC on their way to the EU and to the eurozone. (ECB, 2000, EU Commission, 2000). 
Second, interim solutions, such as fixed but adjustable pegs, are found to be particularly 
problematic, since in the circumstances of increased capital mobility they are particularly 
exposed to possible speculative attacks and are therefore  inherently vulnerable. (Begg, 
1998). Third, in the last two years there were quite a few shifts in the exchange rate 
arrangements of CEEC in the direction of the so-called corner or bipolar solutions. This 
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means that interim regimes of the fixed but adjustable type were abandoned in favor of 
either very rigid arrangements (such as currency boards) or very flexible arrangements 
(such as almost free floating). (Backe, 2000). An alternative explanation would be that 
there was a general move towards increased flexibility of the exchange rate regimes of 
CEEC, while currency board arrangements should be seen as a result of very specific 
circumstances (serious lack of credibility). (Bulde, 2000). Fourth, it is important that 
countries design timely exit strategies in order to prepare for smooth shifts to the new 
exchange rate arrangements. (Eichengreen, 1998 and 1999). 
 
After their EU accession, exchange rates of CEEC become the matter of common concern 
and their currencies are expected to join the ERM 2 (Exchange rate mechanism 2). Due to 
the limited experience of this mechanism (only two currencies participating, only less than 
three years of functioning), literature on this exchange rate arrangements is only starting to 
emerge. However, some issues, such as its design, rules and procedures, its performance 
etc. deserve additional research, particularly since the ERM 2 is - through its role in the 
Maastricht exchange rate criterion - crucial for determining the dynamics of joining the 
euro area for CEEC. Open questions which are particularly relevant for CEEC are the 
following: First, is this exchange rate mechanism flexible enough for these countries to 
prepare their currencies for a soft landing in the eurozone? Second, does ERM 2 as a 
specific form of adjustable peg expose CEEC to particular exchange rate vulnerability? 
Third, how should exit strategies from present arrangements be designed, particularly in 
the light of recent evolution of the very basic concept of the ERM 2? If ERM 2 is being 
understood as a broader framework (EU commission, 2000, ECB, 2000), which can 
include most individual exchange rate arrangements, except for those which are clearly 
incompatible with its requirements, this problem should be largely overcome. 
 
The largest part of the academic literature dealing directly or indirectly with the exchange 
rate regimes of CEEC is in fact forward looking, in the sense that the issue is analysed in 
the framework of future inclusion of these countries in the monetary union. This body of 
literature is based on optimum currency area theory (Mundell, 1961). It starts from 
analysing the exposure to symmetric vs. asymmetric shocks in a monetary union and from 
discussing  the availability and flexibility of alternative mechanisms of adjustment (such as 
fiscal policy, labor mobility, flexibility of wages) which come into play once a country 
joins a monetary union and gives up its exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment. This 
is the basis for the assessment of expected costs and benefits from joining the monetary 
union. (Fidermuc and Schardax, 2000, DeGrauwe and Lavrač, 1999, Boone and Maurel, 
1999). However, as the membership in the European monetary union is mandatory for the 
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new EU countries, the issue of costs and benefits, although analytically relevant, is 
irrelevant from a decision-making perspective. Research should perhaps be directed more 
to the dynamics of expected costs and benefits of joining the monetary union, which 
should give some additional insight into the debate on too early vs. too late accession of 
CEEC to the euro area. 
 
Another recent trend in the literature is the debate on nominal vs. real convergence 
(Bjorkstein, 2000). While nominal convergence, embodied in the Maastricht convergence 
criteria has to do with macroeconomic stability, real convergence has to do with catching-
up in the GDP per capita level and related to this with structural reforms and finishing the 
transition process for CEEC. Within this framework, recently fashionable topic is the 
Balassa Samuelson (B-S) effect for CEEC (Pelkmans, 2000, Coricelli and Jazbec, 2001). 
According to this theory, there is a trend appreciation of the real exchange rate in transition 
economies, which originates from differential growth of productivity in the tradable vs. 
non-tradable sector in the catching-up economies. (Clark and MacDonald, 1998, Halpern 
and Wyplosz, 1997). The implication is that transition economies due to B-S effect should 
experience somewhat higher inflation rates. Some authors therefore suggest that the 
Maastricht convergence criterion on inflation should be adjusted for the case of CEEC to 
take account of the transition-inherent inflation dynamics in their catching-up process. 
(Pelkmans, 2000, Szapary, 2000). 
 
According to the EU official views, nominal and real convergence should run in parallel. 
In other words, CEEC should for the moment not concentrate too early and too intensively 
on meeting the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria, at the expense of neglecting 
structural reforms leading to their real convergence. The central issue in this debate is the 
following: Is monetary integration possible among countries at the different level of 
economic development? Experience of historical monetary unions, of EMU itself and of 
some federal states which can be seen as functioning “monetary unions”, demonstrates that 
it is possible, although perhaps more demanding. This issue is very relevant for the debate 
on the dynamics of the inclusion of CEEC in the eurozone. Further research should be 
devoted to costs and benefits of a too early vs. a too late admission of CEEC to the 
eurozone, to explore the risks for both sides - the eurosystem itself and for CEEC.  
 
Finally, as a shortcut to the membership in the European monetary union, suggestions for 
an unilateral adoption of the euro emerged in the academic literature in CEEC. (Rostowski, 
2000, Nuti, 2000, Coricelli, 2000). Inspired by earlier experience and debate on 
dollarisation, (Berg and Borenstein, 2000) particularly in Latin America, the idea is to 
 15 
abandon domestic currency and to adopt the euro, thereby unilaterally and informally 
joining the European monetary union. The costs and benefits of this solution are well 
established, but the overall evidence is not conclusive. (Wojcik, 2000). Anyway, the EU is 
opposing this idea, which runs counter to its concept of the phased process of successive 
steps in joining the euro area for CEEC.  
 
In concluding it could be said that the research on appropriate exchange rate regimes of 
CEEC on their way to the eurozone will intensify in the next few years and will find new 





The paper starts with discussing some currently most debated issues in the area of 
monetary policy, first in general, then from the point of view of the ECB and finally from 
the point of view of CEEC in their run up to the EU and to the eurozone. With respect to 
the eastward enlargement of the eurozone, the main questions from the point of view of the 
ECB seems to be the following: Will the participation of CEEC, supposedly financially 
weaker and in terms of policies less responsible countries, mean a danger for the stability 
of the euro? Will it corrupt the decision-making process in the ECB? Will it worsen the 
quality of the European single monetary policy and its credibility, particularly in the case 
of an early entry of CEEC in the eurozone? The paper offers some arguments why this may 
not be the case.  
 
The paper attempts to identify the adjustments, both of legalistic and economic nature, 
which CEEC will have to undertake in the area of monetary policy in order to prepare 
themselves for their soft landing in the eurozone. In the phased process of their monetary 
integration they will have to go through specific interim institutional arrangements, such as 
the ERM 2, before they fulfill the Maastricht convergence criteria and finally adopt the 
euro. In their run up to the eurozone they are under the constraints of their transition-
specific structural characteristics, such as the need to build up adequate institutions, 
speeding up their structural reforms and catching up with the EU GDP per capita level. 
Additional challenges for their monetary policies come from their exposure to high and 
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potentially volatile capital flows and from their transition-specific price dynamics 
(Balassa-Samuelson effect).  
 
The paper finally discusses some fiscal and exchange rate dilemmas of CEEC, related to 
their monetary policies. In the fiscal area, the paper focuses on the scope and constraints of 
the national fiscal policy in a monetary union in the context of the debate on fiscal 
federalism within the EMU. For CEEC, the main task remains the conduct of responsible 
fiscal policies and sustainability of their fiscal position once in the EMU. As far as their 
exchange rate policies are concerned, CEEC are at the moment, before joining the EU, free 
to choose their exchange rate arrangements according to their individual preferences.  
After their EU accession, their exchange rate policies become the matter of common 
concern and they are expected to join the ERM 2. Finally, the paper touches upon the issue 
of dynamics of the entry of CEEC in the eurozone, which has to do with the concept of real 
convergence. Possible opportunities and risks to both sides, EU and CEEC, related to 
either early or late inclusion of CEEC in the eurozone, deserve additional research before a 
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